F-35B STOVL - Balancing the Books - or
Haemorrhaging the Defence Budget.
Executive
Summary.
i.
This
paper questions whether the Secretary of State based his recent decision on
reversion to the F-35B STOVL aircraft on accurate and adequate advice from the
MoD and other sources.
ii.
It
addresses the questionable timescales used by the Secretary of State to justify
his decision and it discusses severe operational deficiencies/risks in the
planned capability of the F-35B STOVL aircraft.
iii.
The
financial benefits (or otherwise) to be realised from the reversion to STOVL
aircraft and ramp fitted decks is then questioned and the paper raises a major
financial risk factor (through life cost) that does not appear to have been
adequately addressed by advisers.
iv.
The
paper then briefly argues that the poor decisions taken concerning the
management and direction of the Carrier Strike are a direct result of the
misleading advice provided by MoD over the past decade: not a result of
Ministerial incompetence in either Government.
v.
However,
it does conclude that a full investigation into the above issues and corrective
action is necessary - without which Ministers could be held responsible and
accountable for the inevitable emasculation of our future Carrier Strike capability
and for the haemorrhaging of the defence budget which will take place as a
result of their recent decision.
Introduction.
1. It was evident from the recent
hearing of the Public Accounts Committee on Carrier Strike that the Ministry of
Defence witness, the Permanent Undersecretary, was not quoting from the available
up-to-date costs for the Queen Elizabeth
Carrier Project. As a result the PUS did
not furnish the Committee with any valid or accurate statement concerning the
progress of this Project.
2. If the PUS was unable to demonstrate
proper accountability and control of the Project to the Committee (of all MOD
personnel, the PUS was best placed to have received a full briefing from her
subordinates), this raises the serious question as to whether the Secretary of
State himself was properly and fully briefed by MOD concerning the recent
U-turn on the F-35 choice for our new carriers.
Was the Secretary of State
Given Incorrect Advice?
3. From the content of his statement to
the House of Commons concerning this matter, it would appear that the Right
Honourable Philip Hammond MP had been misinformed by MOD on several issues
(including timescales, costs, interoperability, global capability, to mention
but a few).
4. Clearly, if our Ministers are not
provided with accurate information by MoD concerning major procurement
programs, they cannot make the right decisions concerning the future of our
national defence capability. Further,
a) If there is a gross imbalance between
‘short term savings and long-term costs’ and ‘national strategic capability’
and
b) If this is not clearly pointed out to
Ministers, then it is likely that wrong decisions will be taken for the wrong
reasons and great harm can be inflicted on the Nation’s future strategic
capability and MoD’s economic credibility.
5. This would certainly appear to have
been the case with the U-turn on the choice of F-35 aircraft for our new
carriers.
Balanced
Judgement requires a Level Playing Field.
6. The very relevant, recent focus upon
the Voyager aircraft project and the latter's extraordinary costs raises
important questions concerning the ability of MoD to compare properly the
efficacy and worth of major projects when faced with the need to reduce defence
expenditure. Had a better financial
appreciation been made concerning the Voyager project, unit procurement costs
for 14 aircraft would have totalled £700 million with an estimated through life
cost of 1.5 x procurement cost resulting in a total bill of £1.75 billion - as
opposed to the extraordinary figure of up to £12 billion (far more than the Carrier
Project).
7. The Secretary of State has
highlighted that the Carrier Project and its Air Group as at the very heart of the
UK’s Strategic Defence Policy - as such taxpayers might reasonably consider
that it should maintain pride of place in the priority list for defence
expenditure. This view is, however, evidently not the case within MOD and this
anomaly calls into question the strong possibility of vested interests and slack
overall defence spending accountability.
8. Against this background, it would
appear that under the present regime, the ‘loudest voice’ is heard irrespective
of the operational strategic requirement and financial/operational common
sense.
The
Loudest Voice.
9. Is it not reasonable for the taxpayer
to expect that the Secretary of State would seek and place considerable weight
on the operational views of the military operator of the equipment to be
procured? In the case of the Carrier Project, including its air group, the
military operator is the Royal Navy, by definition.
10. At a time when:
a) The Government was clearly misled
(SDSR 2010) over the wisdom of withdrawing the Harrier and HMS Ark Royal from naval service, thereby
causing an unnecessary gap in Britain's already limited carrier strike
capability and when
b) There is considerable disagreement
between the Services concerning defence funding priority,
should not the Secretary of State have taken direct advice
from the Naval Aviation branch of the Naval Staff about this important Project rather
than listen to those who evidently have no experience or expertise concerning
carrier operations?
11. It has been mooted that the Secretary
of State was not personally briefed by the First Sea Lord and senior Naval
Aviators during the F-35 STOVL decision-making process. If this is so, it casts
doubt upon the efficacy and structure of the existing decision-making process. Perhaps this could have been addressed usefully
by Lord Levene’s Defence Reform Unit.
The
Operational Strategic Requirement.
12. The reversion to the F-35 STOVL
variant of the Joint Strike Fighter is likely to have serious negative
implications for the future strategic capability of our new carriers. The "Carrier Strike" capability of
these new capital warships is unlikely to be achievable: leaving Britain with
just a littoral Amphibious Support Capability.
Timescales.
13. The Secretary of State's words:
‘First, … it has become clear that operational Carrier
Strike capability, using the ‘cats and traps’ system, could not be delivered
until late 2023 at the earliest, considerably later than the date envisaged at
the time of the SDSR of “around 2020”’.
14. Project officials have indicated that
the Prince of Wales could be in
service with an angled deck and the F-35C by early 2020; and the F-35C will
have its weapons systems fully cleared for UK service when delivered. This is
not the case with the F-35B which will require a prolonged and intensive
weapons flight test program before it is cleared for UK operational use –
thereby delaying its availability for front line service.
15. Further to paragraph 14, above, it is
not understood how the advisers to the Secretary of State can predict a firm date
for the operational availability of the F-35B when this cannot yet be
established by the US Department of Defence (the recent GAO report is
relevant).
16. The Secretary of State's words:
‘Because Britain’s
carriers will have all electric propulsion, and therefore do not generate steam
like nuclear powered vessels, the catapult system would need to be the
innovative Electromagnetic version (EMALS), being developed for the US Navy.
Fitting this new system to a UK carrier has presented greater design challenges
than were anticipated.’
This statement is obfuscatory and misleading. The EMALS
system has already been developed and will be fitted to the new US nuclear
carrier Gerald Ford. It would appear that British Aerospace Systems
has either neglected to cater for the possible fit of this system as required
under contract or is exaggerating the design challenges. The fitting of EMALS should not in any way
delay the planned timescale for the introduction of the carrier to service.
17. The Secretary of State's words:
‘But the facts have changed. I am not
prepared to accept a delay in regenerating Britain’s carrier strike capability
beyond the timetable set out in the SDSR.’
Had the Secretary of State been informed correctly by his
advisers concerning the achievable in service date of the Prince of Wales and the weapons testing delays of any UK F-35B
program, he would have realised that there was not going to be ‘a further delay’
in regenerating Britain's carrier strike capability. The F-35C option is on
target for achieving SDSR timescales.
Carrier Strike.
18. Contrary to the advice given to the
Secretary of State, reversion to the F-35B STOVL will not provide Britain with
an effective ‘operational Carrier Strike capability’. The STOVL aircraft has a
significantly lower radius of action and weapons payload than the F-35C and no ‘buddy-buddy’
air to air refuelling capability to extend its operational range. The perspective of the United States Navy and
Marine Corps is that the STOVL aircraft is ‘an amphibious support weapons
system’, no more and no less. Both of these American services are procuring the
F-35C to satisfy their Carrier Strike requirement.
RISK FACTOR 1 – OPERATIONAL
CAPABILITY.
19. It is considered highly probable that
the Secretary of State was not fully informed of the major difficulties facing
the STOVL aircraft for operations in high temperatures. These difficulties stem
from the power/weight ratio of the aircraft and are so significant that they
have dictated a major change in the manner in which the aircraft is planned to recover
to the deck. The F-35B
will not have enough power to enable operational Vertical Landings on board in
hot climates. A completely untested new
standard recovery known as the Ship Rolling Vertical Landing (SRVL) is now
being proposed to overcome this major "difficulty/loss in
capability".
Ship Rolling Vertical
Landing – F-35B ‘STOSRVL’.
20. It is proposed that the aircraft will
approach the landing point with considerable forward speed relative to the deck
(it will not come to a stationary hover over the deck) to enable extra lift to
be provided by aerodynamic effect over the wings - to make up for insufficient
engine power. It will therefore impact
the deck with a forward speed of approximately 60 kn (70 mph) relative to the
deck (and approximately 90 kn relative to the wind over the deck). The aircraft's computer-controlled wheel
brakes will then be required to bring the 18 ton aircraft to rest before it
disappears over the bow of the ship.
21. To the armchair observer making
subjective judgement, this may be considered an effective engineering solution
to ensure the safe recovery of the aircraft. With a dry deck and no ship
movement (pitch, roll, yaw and heave), such a mode of recovery may indeed be
possible. However, flat calm conditions are extremely rare across the oceans of
the world and, for a significant proportion of the time, warships are subject
to wave and swell action that often generates severe ship motion in pitch, in
roll, in yaw and with vertical heave. Further, the flight deck will often be
wet from the effects of rain and sea spray. In a similar manner to main roads, deposits
from tyres and grease can and do make the flight deck extremely slippery;
especially in wet conditions.
SRVL – THE HAZARD.
22. Picture, if you will, an 18 ton petrol
tanker/truck (the same inertial mass as the F-35B) with only three tyres in
contact with a wet, slippery flight deck surface; travelling at 70 mph and
attempting to come to a halt rapidly and in a safe and controlled fashion when
the rolling/yawing action of the ship is applying immense side forces to the
vehicle (physically moving it either towards the edge of the deck or towards
other aircraft and the ship's superstructure). Add to this the downward pitch of
the ship and downward heave which will markedly reduce the effect of any
braking action being applied through the wheels. The result is an extreme
flight safety hazard in which the driver (pilot) has no control over his truck
(aircraft) and you have 18 tons of expensive, petrol-filled equipment skidding
down the deck at high speed with a mind and a direction of its own.
23.
Obviously,
such a situation is completely unacceptable (catastrophic) and the end result is
likely to be that the F-35 ‘STOSRVL’ aircraft will be inoperable in all but
benign sea states and weather conditions.
24. Is this an issue on which the
Secretary of State was fully briefed? It
appears not and removes all credibility from the Secretary of State's remark:
‘The balance of risk
has changed and there is now judged to be no greater risk in STOVL than in
other variants of JSF.’
RISK FACTOR 2, 3, 4, 5 –
OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY.
25. There are several major technological
risks associated with the continued development of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
which will inevitably have an adverse effect upon Initial Operational
Capability dates. From a UK point of view, delays associated with such risks
will have the most adverse effect on the supposedly earlier IOC of the F-35B
STOVL. Some of these risks have been highlighted in Aviation Week (see Annex B),
the most important of which would appear to be that affecting the aircraft's
stealth qualities.
26. Stealth. It is reported that when a test version of
the F-35 achieved the design speed of Mach 1.6 for the first time last
December, the flight caused "peeling and bubbling" of the plane's
stealth coating. The entire test fleet was subsequently limited to Mach 1.0. The ability to maintain the stealth quality
of the aircraft in the maritime environment is also under question and is not
yet assured.
27. Other serious problems exist with:
a) The Integrated Power Package
(IPP). There is no defined way ahead and
thus the IPP remains a major concurrency risk - a similar system is fitted to
the F-22 Raptor and major problems with its IPP have recently grounded all
aircraft.
b) The daunting issue of computer code
- no end in sight to these problems.
c) Helmet mounted display - an
alternative system may now be required.
28. Was the Secretary of State adequately
briefed on all these problems and risks and how they might affect the F-35B
STOVL availability?
Financial
Truth and Common Sense.
29. The Secretary of State's words:
‘Secondly, and partly as a result of
the delayed timetable, the estimated cost of fitting this equipment to the
Prince of Wales has more than doubled in the last 17 months, rising from an
estimated £950M to around £2Bn, with no guarantee that it will not rise
further.’
30. Following the intervention of U.S.
Navy carrier expertise and more detailed work by the Carrier Project Office, it
is understood that the £2 billion cost given to the Secretary of State has now
been refined down to approximately £1.5 billion. Against this figure one must
balance the cost of reverting the design of the flight deck to ‘ramp-fitted’,
which is understood to cost approximately £450 million (included estimated SRVL-associated
aircraft guidance costs). The resultant saving that can be credited to a
reversion to a ramp fitted deck is therefore likely to be of the order of £1
billion.
31. Although such a figure is not to be
sneezed at (particularly in the light of the Secretary of State's desire to
eradicate the ‘black hole’ in defence spending), it is of concern that the
Secretary of State did not take into account the much larger through life savings
that would be realised through procurement of the F-35C rather than the
F-35B. These amount to approximately £5
billion as referred to in Appendix 1 to Annex A to this paper.
32. The suggestion of a short term cost
saving of £1 billion now at a price to the future defence budget of £5 billion
would appear to lack responsibility and accountability and sets the stage for further
haemorrhaging of that budget.
RISK FACTOR 6 - THE
INCREASING COST OF THE F-35.
33. There have been many alarming
statements from the United States Department of Defense concerning the
spiralling costs of the F-35 program. These have not been lost on other
prospective customers, including the Canadian government. The press release at
Annex B discloses the concerns of the latter, highlighting some of the serious
problems with the project (including major problems with ‘stealth’) and
associated costs.
34. The price paid this year by the U.S.
Air Force for 18 F-35A aircraft is given as US$197 million per aircraft. This
is a far cry from the figures being supplied to the Secretary of State
concerning estimated unit costs (US$111 million for the F-35B).
35. Concurrent development and production
costs continue to rise and raise the questions:
a) Can Britain afford to procure this
F-35 aircraft?
b) Can Britain afford the extra cost
associated with the F-35B ‘STOSRVL’?
36. Based on the figures given in the
Canadian press release, the procurement and through life cost differential
between the F-35B and the F-18 Super Hornet (for a fleet of 60 aircraft) is now
approaching £17 billion and rising (Appendix 1 to Annex A to this paper). This places the £1 billion cost of reversion
to an angled deck into full perspective.
Discussion.
37. In spite of the up-to-date facts
provided above, the MoD continues to respond to letters to the public with the
same spin that was fed to the Secretary of State. The letter at Annex C is an
appropriate example of such spin.
Political
Flip-Flopping?
38. The essence of this issue (the
changes in course forced upon the Carrier Project and its associated air group)
should not be the blaming of one political Party by the other in the House of
Commons. Rather, this issue should be
investigated in full detail by the Public Accounts Committee, the National
Audit Office and the House of Commons Defence Select Committee.
39. The Labour Party decision to opt for
the F-35B in 2002 was taken on the direct advice of MoD and the associated
Defence Committee. At that time, the
decision was firmly opposed by the Naval Staff but they were overruled by a
majority vote in the Defence Committee. This is not something that the Labour
Party can be blamed for.
40. The SDSR 2010 decision to opt for the
F-35C and the angled deck was ‘the correct decision at the time’ (as stated by
our Secretary of State). It too was taken on the direct advice of MoD - and is
therefore a decision for which the Coalition Government should not be blamed. From all logical operational and fiscal points
of view, this remains the correct decision.
41. If operational and financial logic
are to have any weight, it must be accepted that the Defence Committee decision
in 2002 was flawed and the SDSR 2010 decision corrected this. That the
Secretary of State should now have been persuaded through:
a) Misleading facts and
b) A lack of proper briefing on the
implications of reversing the SDSR 2010 decision,
must be considered a serious indictment of the quality of
advice that he has received from MoD and elsewhere.
42. In his statement to the Commons he
remarked:
‘The Chief of the Defence Staff and
his fellow Chiefs of Staff – all of them – endorse this decision as the
quickest and most assured way now to deliver carrier strike as part of an
overall affordable equipment programme that will support Future Force 2020.’
43. It is extremely difficult to believe
that the First Sea Lord would have changed position away from the firm views
expressed by the Naval Staff in 2002 and 2010. It is understood that they, the
Royal Navy, have been consistent in their preference for F-35C and angled
flight decks - because they have the expertise to understand the severe
operational implications of reverting to the STOVL aircraft.
44. This issue is therefore not a result
of Political Flip-Flopping but is clearly brought about by Ministerial Advisers
(whether MoD or otherwise) who have not provided Ministers with up-to-date
facts and implications concerning the decision taken.
Conclusions.
45. Fortunately, it is not too late for a
further change in the way ahead and this must be addressed following a detailed
investigation into:
a) The financial and operational facts
and figures that led to the F-35B STOVL reversion decision and
b) The full implications of the same.
46. Should this investigation indicate
that misleading advice was indeed presented to the Secretary of State, those
responsible should be held accountable.
47. Should such a correction to the way
ahead not be forthcoming, then indeed Ministers may be held responsible and
accountable for:
a) The inevitable emasculation of Britain’s
future Carrier Strike capability and for
b) The haemorrhaging of the defence
budget which will take place as a result of their recent decision.
Annex
A. Carrier Costs: Reversion to STOVL Is
Neither Simple nor Cheap.
Executive
Summary.
- The
short-term cost differential between remaining with the angled deck decision
(SDSR 2010) and opting for ramp-fitted decks to support the STOVL variant
of the aircraft is considerably less than originally anticipated (possibly
less than £1.05 billion). This
differential is likely to be eroded further when the true cost of ship-borne
equipment and support for Ship Rolling Vertical Landings is established.
- A
reversion to STOVL will not result in a marked difference in the date at
which an initial carrier operating capability is achieved.
- The procurement
and through life costs of the STOVL aircraft air group are significantly
greater than those associated with the conventional CV variant (nearly £5
billion more).
- The
operational capability of the STOVL ramp-fitted aircraft carrier is
unlikely to be regarded as Carrier Strike and may equate to a zero
capability in very high temperatures and/or bad weather East of Suez.
- The
adoption of a ramp-fitted deck would remove the option for the future
operation of other carrier borne conventional aircraft, whether manned or
unmanned.
- In warmer
climes, the STOVL aircraft will not be able to land on smaller
decks/platforms in emergency because of the constraints of its
power/weight ratio and consequent planned Ship Rolling Vertical Landing
(as opposed to Vertical Landing) characteristics. THIS ONE ITEM NEGATES
THE ONLY ADVANTAGE THAT THE STOVL AIRCRAFT MIGHT HAVE HAD OVER THE CV
VARIANT.
Introduction.
1. At this time of extreme financial
constraint it is important that the Prime Minister and the Government should
beware of ‘stepping out of the frying pan into the fire’ with regard to any
decision on reversion to STOVL aircraft for our new carriers.
2. This is an extremely complex issue
with far reaching implications if the wrong decision is taken.
Carrier Costs.
The Cost of Current Conversion to Angled
Deck.
3. Declared costs of this conversion
have been given at just under £2 billion. However, when this figure was first
postulated, the United States equipment costs for EMALS and AAG were
‘subjective/inflated UK estimates’ and it is now understood that Britain has
been given very firm and risk-free costs for this equipment that are far less
than the early estimates. (The equipment would not now being fitted into the
new US nuclear carrier Gerald Ford if
they were not fully proven and risk-free.)
4. Just as the equipment cost estimates
were somewhat inflated for contingency purposes, so were the integration costs
that make up the balance of the £2 billion. It is understood that more
realistic estimates of the overall costs of CV carrier conversion are probably
in the region of £1.5 billion.
The Financial Cost of Reversion to
Ramp-Fitted Decks (STOVL).
5. There is a tangible and not
insignificant cost associated with reversion to ramp-fitted decks and if both
ships are to be SRVL compatible the cost is likely to be of the order of £450
million for both ships and possibly more when the true cost of ship-borne
equipment and support for Ship Rolling Vertical Landings is established.
Summary.
6. It is therefore logical to assume
that a reversion now to STOVL and ramp-fitted decks would, in the short term,
save the Treasury and the taxpayer something less than £1.05 billion for the
ships alone. This figure does not
include any development or fitting costs for the aircraft.
Timescales.
7. Current estimates for the in-service
date of the Prince of Wales fitted
with angled deck are towards the end of 2020. It is understood that this date
could be brought forward to early 2020.
8. The Queen Elizabeth enjoys a much earlier in-service date at present
but it is understood that reversion to a ramp-fitted deck would set this date
back at least one year (and perhaps more if contingency work for STOVL/STOSRVL
operability is taken into account).
9. Bearing in mind the two previous
paragraphs, the initially declared capability for the carriers with their air
groups could be no further apart than about one year - that is, with angled
deck Carrier Strike option being just a little later than a STOVL ramp-fitted
deck capability.
The
Operational Cost of Reversion to Ramp-Fitted Decks (STOVL).
10. DSTL studies show that the STOVL
variant of the F-35 will face severe engine performance-related operational
limitations in the high temperatures to be expected East of Suez. Such
limitations call into question the wisdom of opting for this way ahead.
11. Further, a ramp-fitted carrier with
STOVL:
a) Will have no deep strike capability -
a comparatively limited aircraft radius of action (with no embarked air-to-air
refuelling capability.
b) Will only be able to launch aircraft
with significantly lower payload in terms of weapons and fuel.
c) Will have aircraft with much lower
endurance on task - requiring the procurement of more aircraft (increased cost)
to achieve the same level of capability.
d) Is significantly more expensive in
terms of air group procurement and maintenance costs/ through life costs (approximately
£5 billion more for a fleet of 60 aircraft).
12. One must add to these limitations two
significant factors:
a) The adoption of a ramp-fitted deck
would remove the option for the operation of other carrier borne conventional
aircraft, whether manned or unmanned.
b) The requirement for the STOVL
aircraft to carry out Ship Rolling Vertical Landings negates the flexibility
associated with vertical landing on other smaller decks.
Summary.
13. The short-term cost differential
between remaining with the angled deck decision (SDSR 2010) and opting for
ramp-fitted decks to support the STOVL variant of the aircraft is considerably
less than originally anticipated (possibly less than £1.05 billion). This differential is likely to be eroded
further when the true cost of ship-borne equipment and support for Ship Rolling
Vertical Landings is established.
14. A reversion to STOVL will not result
in a marked difference in the date at which an initial carrier operating
capability is achieved.
15. The through life costs of the STOVL
aircraft are significantly greater than those associated with the conventional
CV variant (approximately £5 billion more – see spread sheet at Appendix 1).
16. The operational capability of the
STOVL ramp-fitted aircraft carrier is unlikely to be regarded as Carrier Strike
and may equate to a zero capability in very high temperatures East of Suez.
17. The adoption of a ramp-fitted deck
would remove the option for the future operation of other carrier borne conventional
aircraft, whether manned or unmanned.
18. In warmer climes, the STOVL aircraft
will not be able to land on smaller decks/platforms in emergency because of the
constraints of its power/weight ratio and consequent planned Ship Rolling
Vertical Landing (as opposed to Vertical Landing) characteristics. This one
item negates the only advantage that the STOVL aircraft might have had over the
CV variant.
Conclusion.
19. Reversion to a STOVL ramp-fitted
carrier deck:
a) Would save the Exchequer less in the
short term than originally anticipated.
b) Would cost the taxpayer far more in
the longer term.
c) Would adversely affect the date at
which the first carrier would be available for operations.
d) Would remove the option for the
future operation of other carrier borne conventional aircraft, whether manned
or unmanned.
e) Would markedly diminish the planned
Carrier Strike capability and flexibility of the new carriers for the
projection of British Foreign Policy.
Appendix
1. Air Group Costs (Costs in £ millions)
.
|
The average
UPC used for project costing (as agreed with CDM) is $111M for CV and $128M
for STOVL.
|
|||
|
Cost of
recent delivery of 18 F-35As to USAF is given as US$197 million each. For demonstration purposes, this is the
figure used below for the F-35C.
|
|||
|
Aircraft Unit
Costs
|
|
|
Comment
|
|
F-35B STOVL
|
£141.59
|
|
With only 20% of testing complete this figure
is likely to rise significantly. As costs rise the number of aircraft on
order will fall resulting in even higher unit cost.
|
|
F-35C
|
£123
|
|
|
|
F-18E/F Unit Costs
|
£38
|
|
|
|
F-18G Super Growler
|
£56
|
|
|
|
Mix of F-18 Super Hornet
|
£41
|
|
48 Super Hornets and 12 Super Growlers.
|
|
Carrier Fleet
of 60 Aircraft Procurement Cost
|
|
|
|
|
F-35B STOVL
|
£8,496
|
|
|
|
F-35C
|
£7,388
|
|
|
|
F-18
|
£2,475
|
|
|
|
F-18
Procurement Saving against STOVL
|
£6,021
|
|
|
|
F-18
Procurement Saving against F35C
|
£4,913
|
|
|
|
Aircraft Unit through
life costs
|
|
|
Comment
|
|
F35B STOVL
|
£350
|
|
Officially estimated to be 25% more than the F35C
aircraft.
|
|
F-35C
|
£280
|
|
The current US appraisal for operations and
support is $1.1 trillion for 2457 aircraft.
This figure is expected to rise.
|
|
F-18 (40% less than F35C)
|
£168
|
|
|
|
Difference
F18/F35B
|
£182
|
|
|
|
Difference
F18/F35C
|
£112
|
|
|
|
Total Cost
differential between F35C and STOVL
|
|||
|
Fleet of 60 Aircraft
|
Aircraft
cost
|
Thru
Life Cost
|
Total
|
|
F35B
|
£8,496
|
£20,985.96
|
£29,481.58
|
|
F35C
|
£7,388
|
£16,788.77
|
£24,176.27
|
|
Therefore
F35C choice over STOVL saves Tax Payer
|
|
|
£5,305.32
|
|
Total Cost
differential between F35C and F-18
|
|||
|
Fleet of 60 Aircraft
|
Aircraft
cost
|
Thru
Life Cost
|
Total
|
|
F35C
|
£7,388
|
£16,788.77
|
£24,176.27
|
|
F-18
|
£2,475
|
£10,073.26
|
£12,548.26
|
|
Therefore
F-18 choice over F35C saves Tax Payer
|
|
|
£11,628.01
|
|
Total Cost
differential between F35B STOVL and F-18
|
|||
|
Fleet of 60 Aircraft
|
Aircraft
cost
|
Thru
Life Cost
|
Total
|
|
F35B
|
£8,495.63
|
£20,985.96
|
£29,481.58
|
|
F-18
|
£2,475
|
£10,073.26
|
£12,548.26
|
|
Therefore
F-18 choice over F35B STOVL saves Tax Payer
|
|
|
£16,933.32
|
Annex B: A costly mistake —
that keeps getting costlier [Canada].
“Even now, we have no real idea what the
price of each F-35 will be”
Michael Byers and Stewart
Webb
Debates about the costs of the F-35 stealth fighter overlook a crucial
point: it is only a prototype that's still being tested and modified.
As the U.S. Government Accountability Office reported in March, the
Pentagon is "incurring substantial additional costs to retrofit produced
aircraft to correct deficiencies discovered in testing." Worse yet,
"until manufacturing processes are in control and engineering design
changes resulting from information gained during developmental testing are
reduced, there is risk of more cost growth."
Design changes are needed with regard to the "fibre mat" that
is cured into the composite surfaces of the aircraft, and which provides a
large portion of its stealth.
According to Aviation Week, when a test version of the
F-35 achieved the design speed of Mach 1.6 for the first time last December,
the flight caused "peeling and bubbling" of the plane's stealth
coating. The entire test fleet was subsequently limited to Mach 1.0.
Improvements also are required for the "helmet mounted
display" that is supposed to give the pilot a 360-degree view, via cameras
mounted on the plane. There are problems with the night-vision capability of
the helmets, jittering in their displays, and potentially fatal delays in
transmitting data to them.
According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office's report:
"The selected helmet will not be integrated with the baseline aircraft
until 2014 or later, increasing the risks of a major system redesign, retrofits
of already built aircraft, or changes in concepts of operation."
A third area of concern is the "integrated power package" that
is supposed to incorporate the engine starter, power generator and
environmental control system into what the U.S. Department of Defense describes
as a "high-reliability 2,200-flight-hour-subsystem." High-reliability
is vital because breakdowns in the integrated power package can result in the
loss of primary avionics, oxygen supply and cabin pressure. [A similar problem has recently grounded the
entire F-22 raptor fleet of 5th generation aircraft.]
A technological fix is desperately needed, but according to a Pentagon
report issued in November 2011, "there is no defined way ahead and thus
the IPP [integrated power package] remains a major concurrency risk."
Finally, there is the daunting issue of computer code. So far, the F-35
requires 24-million lines of code, 9.5-million of which are located in the
aircraft. That's roughly three times more code than the F-35's sister aircraft,
the F-22, and six times more than the F/A-18 Super Hornet (the latest version
of the F-18s currently operated by Canada).
The process of writing and verifying all this code is far from complete.
According to last November's Pentagon report, "while software growth
appears to be moderating, contractor officials report that almost half of the
on-board software has yet to complete integration and test—typically the most
challenging phase of software development."
So while no longer a purely experimental "X-plane," the F-35
is far from fully operational and should never have been given the
"F" designation of a completed fighter jet.
All these problems are rooted in a decision, taken more than a decade
ago, to adopt a "test and repair" approach to the development and production of the plane. This approach has resulted in massive uncertainties — including with respect to costs. And not surprisingly, as the uncertainties are resolved, the costs go up rather than down.
In 2001, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office was estimating a per-plane cost of $74.6million; by 2010,
that had climbed to $132.9million; by 2011, it was up to $156million.
This year, the U.S. Air
Force paid $197-million each for 18 planes that will undoubtedly have to
undergo substantial modifications post-delivery.
How much will the final version of the F-35 actually cost?
How long is a piece of string?
National Post
Michael Byers holds the Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and
International Law at the University of British Columbia. Stewart Webb is a
Research Associate of the Salt Spring Forum. They are the authors of the
article "Canada's F-35 Purchase is a Costly Mistake," published
earlier this year in the peer-reviewed Canadian Foreign Policy Journal.
Annex C. Letter from Secretariat (Equipment Capability) - Maritime Level 2.K.11 dated 14 May 2012.
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE Main Building, Whitehall, London SW1A2HB
Our Ref: Sec(EC) 02-20 Mr R Shuttleworth 45
Warriner Gardens London SW11 4EA
14 May
2012
Dear Mr Shuttleworth,
Thank you for your further
email to the Secretary of State of 12 April regarding the choice of aircraft
for the Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers. I have been asked to respond.
As you will have seen, the
Defence Secretary has now announced the Government's decision and I thought it
would be helpful to outline the reasoning behind their decision. It is
important to remember the financial context in which these decisions were taken
and the hard choices the Government has had to make in order to focus resources
where they are most needed. During the Strategic Defence and Security Review
(SDSR), the Government committed to ensuring Britain's future Carrier Strike
capability based around the new Queen Elizabeth Class Carriers and the new
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). As part of that decision the Government decided to
purchase the Carrier Variant (CV) of JSF and to operate it from a ship fitted
with catapults and arrestor gear ('cats and traps'), instead of the Short
Takeoff Vertical Landing (STOVL) version. The introduction of the new aircraft
carriers, carrying the new Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft, was planned to take
place around 2020. It was a difficult and finely balanced decision, but, based
on the information available at the time, it was the right one. It was also
subject to an 18 month study looking at the costs and technical feasibility of
such a new approach, in order to enable the Carrier Variant of the Joint Strike
Fighter to become part of the capability. That has been subject to further
detailed work assessing the technical and financial risks involved in the new
approach, and in particular fitting cats and traps.
As a result of that work, it
has become clear that the facts have changed. As the programme has matured,
with more detailed analysis carried out by suppliers,
it has become apparent that an operational Carrier Strike capability using
'cats and traps' would not be delivered until 2023 at the earliest, and will
cost twice as much as originally estimated. We do not believe that either the
delay, or this increase in costs, is acceptable. The cost growth would distort
the equipment budget, crowding out other important investment in our Armed
Forces, and it extends the time period when our Armed Forces will be without a
carrier strike capability.
Therefore, we will
procure the STOVL variant to fly off the Queen Elizabeth class carriers. This
means we can start flying jets off the Queen Elizabeth in 2018, years earlier
than would otherwise have been possible, and at an affordable price.
The 'STOVL'
variant is now a much less risky option than it was at the time of the SDSR.
Although its range is lower than the Carrier Variant JSF, it is nonetheless a
5th generation stealth aircraft, with a range significantly greater than that
of Harrier, and it represents a step change in Britain's combat air capability.
Air to air refuelling will enable the range to be extended in most
circumstances, while a STOVL carrier can more easily operate jets and
helicopters simultaneously, increasing our amphibious capabilities.
This will also allow us the
option at the next SDSR to have the choice of carrier capability available
continuously, as we will be able to bring into service the second carrier, the
Prince of Wales, as an active capability, covering any extended periods where
the Queen Elizabeth is in maintenance. Although the final decision on that will
be made in the 2015 SDSR.
The
Government believe that getting Carrier Strike right is critical to securing
our defences for the future and that this decision paves the way to us
achieving a sustainable and balanced Budget. .
I trust this helps clarify the situation.
Yours sincerely
|
MA Barton Lt Cdr RN
|
