Gloom at the Top over Libya

Gloom at the Top.

Is Misleading Advice and Vested Interest threatening Britain’s Sovereign Will.

Introduction.

1.         With the Libyan Crusade falling apart around the Prime Minister’s ears and Sarkozy and the Italians apparently jumping ship, the chaos in Whitehall appears to get worse by the day.

2.         First Sea Lord gets a rap over the knuckles for things that he did not say and, reportedly, this resulted in a somewhat vengeful change of heart by the government concerning the possible reintroduction of Harrier to service.

3.         Then, after publicly blasting the three service chiefs, the Prime Minister goes to the RAF College, Cranwell and assures the officer cadets that the RAF is “essential”. Shortly afterwards, the Secretary of State formally announces that the RAF is not for “breaking up”.  (In the MP vernacular such assurances and statements frequently mean the opposite – as with the Prime Minister’s pledge before the election that National Defence was his number one priority.)

4.         These incidents and their timing could be interpreted as a certain level of favouritism within Whitehall circles for the Royal Air Force cause. After all, the PR image of the Royal Air Force is much stronger in Britain than that of either the Royal Navy or the Army. Could it be that our senior ministers are already counting votes for the next election?

5.         Then we have the article by David Davis MP in the Times newspaper, 12 July 2011, “Chinook verdict stains the honour of the RAF”.  Should this not be a wake-up call for the Prime Minister and his colleagues who, up till now, have appeared to believe everything that MoD tells them – irrespective of logicality or common sense.

6.         The last paragraph of Mr Davis’ article includes the following remarkable statement:

“…the air marshals will stand alone in defiance of Commons committees, the law lords, the Royal Aeronautical Society, RAF test pilots and the facts.”

A fascinating insight from a Member of Parliament, is it not?

7.         In the last decade, our Ministers and Politicians (and Civil Servants) may have had no completely substantial reason for suspecting the validity of information they have received from MoD. Hence, the perpetual stream of letters and Parliamentary answers from Ministers which summarily discount the challenges that defence specialists have put forward concerning the efficacy of some statements/claims made about air power and, specifically, ground attack fighter aircraft.  (Whitehall appears to have forgotten that in 1982 the RAF were unable to project fighter air power over the Falklands – in spite of earlier promises to the contrary.)  However, there is now a very good reason for Ministers et al to believe that they have been misled. Libya!

8.         Reliance upon land-based air for operations against Col Gaddafi’s forces will have proven a gross mistake and a huge embarrassment if the Italians and French do withdraw.  We, Britain, shall be left holding the baby without any real ability to provide Close Air Support to the Libyan rebels – except for the Apache attack helicopter operating from HMS Ocean.  So much for offshore basing rights, the recently signed “porte-avion entente cordiale” and the independence of British Sovereign Will!  Mr Davis’ remarkable comment just adds grist to the mill.

8.         I trust that the Coalition Government will now stand up and be counted; there is an irrefutable need to curtail the flow of misleading information from MoD and to hold those people to account who have used their single service interest to the detriment of our National Security and Defence Capability.  Libya is a case in point.

Libya:  Britain’s Sovereign Will is at Risk.

Background.

9.         The public statement by the French Defence Minister, that France must withdraw from the Libya No Fly Zone Operations soon, arguably had nothing whatsoever to do with ‘progress on the ground in Libya’.

10.       He and the French Government have now realised that supporting operations over Libya using land-based air instead of the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier (which is due to be withdrawn for a refit) is an extortionately expensive exercise that they cannot afford. For each strike mission launched from the French mainland by their air force, at least four air-to-air refuelling tankers are required.

11.       France’s decision process on this issue may also have been strongly influenced by the vaunted intention of Italy to withdraw from the confrontation. Without the support of Italian air bases, France clearly understands that it cannot afford to continue the operation from mainland France.

12.       The silence from the British government on this matter is deafening!  We, the UK, cannot possibly conduct effective and sustained Close Air Support operations over Libya direct from the UK mainland. (It costs approximately £200,000 in aviation fuel alone to get one fighter ground attack aircraft close to the Libyan border.)

Britain’s Problem.

13.       Britain and France together led NATO into the Libyan Operation. In order for Britain to continue with the Operation, we are almost totally reliant on being able to operate our fighter ground attack aircraft from Italian soil[1]. Each of these trusted allies are now about to withdraw – and presumably without any ‘by your leave’ from the British government.

14.       The sovereign will of the British Government to continue its operations in Libya is therefore likely to be controlled or at least adversely affected by the sovereign will of France and Italy.  The root cause for this politically embarrassing situation is twofold:

a)     Britain misguidedly decided to rely on land-based air for offshore operations instead of sea-based air (SDSR 2010).  (British operations by sea-based airpower in Libya would not have been affected by the withdrawal of either the French or the Italians.)

b)    Britain engaged in a partnership with the French government on a venture that relied upon mutual trust and staying power: in the light of centuries of history, a very unwise decision.

15.       The Defence Accord or “porte-avion entente cordiale” so recently signed by the British and French governments would appear to have faltered at the first step – and at the first sign of disagreement between our nations concerning the way ahead for a military operation. Tying ourselves in any way to the sovereign will of France must therefore be seen as an abrogation of national governmental responsibility of the highest order.

16.       Co-operating with France is entirely different from ‘getting into bed with them hook, line and sinker’. Allowing France to dictate our options for offshore operations is unthinkable and, yet, that is exactly what our Coalition Government is proposing when they suggest that we should share the use of our aircraft carriers.

17.       Please refer to my earlier blog, “The French Connection” for some expanded views on this issue.

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[1] Akrotiri in Cyprus it is as far from Tripoli as the distance from Libya to UK.